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19571 NOTES
Undoubtedly there is a strong belief among many that judicial
reversals on procedural errors in informal proceedings would deter
the administrative process. Even if that be true, the court ought not
to be so liberal in protecting public rights where individual rights
and liberty are involved. Rather, the objections to informal hearings
must be closely subject to the Court's scrutiny. This judicial guard-
ianship would guarantee our constitutional rights, and thereby, more
effectively balance the scales between our need for the independence
of administrative procedures and the preservation of individual prop-
erty and liberty.
SOME ASPECTS OF WIRETAPPING IN THE FEDERAL
AND NEw YORK JURISDICTIONS
Introduction
Wiretapping, a problem of our electronic civilization, has in recent
years received widespread publicity. Wholesale invasions of privacy
have been the order of the day. The seriousness of the situation
has engendered unrestrained comment both in legal and non-legal
publications.'
The treatment of wiretapping in its social aspects is, of course,
beyond the limited bounds of this article. Its purpose is merely to
sketch the evolution and present status of the law in the federal and
Nev York jurisdictions with respect to the admissibility of wiretap
material in evidence.
The Law in the Federal Jurisdiction
In Olmstead v. United States,2 the United States Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether wiretapping constituted an illegal search
and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The de-
fendants there were convicted of violating the National Prohibition
Act. The information resulting in their conviction was obtained
chiefly through the interception of the defendants' telephone conver-
sations by federal prohibition agents. Defendants contended that the
1 See Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and A Legislative
Proposal, 52 COLUm. L. Ra,. 165 (1952) ; Note, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1956) ;
Note, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 268 (1956) ; Time, March 19, 1956, p. 67; Life, March
7, 1955, p. 45; America, Dec. 5, 1953, p. 90; The Reporter, Jan. 6, 1953, p. 6;
The Reporter, Dec. 23, 1952, p. 8.
2277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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wiretapping involved was violative of the fourth amendment provision
against unreasonable searches and seizures as well as the fifth amend-
ment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. The Court
held that the Constitution was not violated in either instance. The
majority said that the language of the fourth amendment could not
validly be ". . . extended and expanded to include telephone wires
reaching to the whole world from defendant's house or office." 3
Likewise the terms of the fifth amendment were not violated since
defendants were in no way compelled to carry on incriminating con-
versations over their telephones.
The" Olmstead decision meant wiretap evidence would be admitted
in federal courts where no trespass could be shown. Widespread
opposition to this situation developed and a series of bills was intro-
duced in Congress to outlaw wiretap evdence.4 In 1934 while bills
professedly designed to deal with wiretapping were being debated and
ultimately defeated, the Federal Communications Act became law.5
Unobtrusively embedded therein was Section 605 of that Act which
forbade the interception and divulgence by any person of information
derived from radio or wire communications. 6 It is questionable
whether the framers of this statute ever intended to legislate on the
admissibility of wiretap evidence.7
The possibilities inherent in the statutory language were first
caught sight of three years later in Nardone v. United States.8 De-
fendants had been convicted for the illegal smuggling of liquor. The
Court found that the government's case, to a substantial degree, was
grounded on intercepted telephone messages. Section 605 was con-
strued to forbid the divulgence of these communications in federal
court by anyone, including federal agents. The Nardone result was
widely criticized as based on an uncalled-for statutory construction. 9
Two years later the government was once more before the Court
in an attempt to sustain Nardone's conviction. On this occasion the
prosecution's case was based not on direct wiretapping evidence but
on leads obtained therefrom. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority, referred to this evidence as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." 10 The Court said:
3 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
4 H.R. 5416, H.R. 4139, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929); S. Rep. No. 6061,
S. Rep. No. 3344, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931). See 74 CONG. REc. 3928 (1931).
548 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 7-609 (1952).
648 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
7 The courts ignored § 605 and continued to permit the introduction of wire-
tap evidence. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 91 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1937);
Beard v. United States, 82 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655(1936) ; In re Milburne, 77 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935).
8 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
9 See, e.g., 53 HARV. L. Rav. 863 (1940); 34 ILL L. REv. 758 (1940);
25 MiN. L. REv. 382 (1941).
10 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
[ VOL. 32
NOTES
To reduce the scope of Section 605 to exclusion of exact words heard
through forbidden interception, allowing these interceptions every derivative
use they may serve . . . would largely stultify the policy which compelled our
decision in Nardone v. United States .... 11
Another Court decision in the same year rendered still more far-
reaching the application of Section 605. In Weiss v. United States.
12
the question presented was whether the statute was applicable to
strictly intrastate communications. The Court held that the statutory
interdiction extended to intrastate as well as interstate messages.
The rationale was that a tapper would find it impossible to establish
beforehand whether a given telephone call would cross state lines and
consequently, a blanket prohibition would have to be imposed. The
Weiss case further held that defendant's consent to disclosure of
wiretap conversations obtained only by the government's promise of
leniency did not constitute "authorization by the sender." 18
In Goldstein v. United States,14 an interesting fact pattern gave
the Couit an opportunity to limit somewhat the scope of Section 605.
The case involved fraud by mail wherein federal agents persuaded
two men, after they heard recordings of their telephone conversations,
to testify in the prosecutions of three accomplices. In affirming the
convictions, the Court held that a person who is not a party to tapped
conversations is without standing to object to their "ase by the gov-
ernment in obtaining testimony. The fact that feder-a officers com-
mitted a crime in persuading the two recalcitrant witnesses to testify
was treated as an immaterial circumstance.
The case of Goldman v. United States 15 placed another restric-
tion on the employment of Section 605. There federal agents entered
defendant's law office at night and installed a detectaphone in an ad-
joining room which was sensitive enough to pick up his telephone
conversations. Conviction for conspiracy to violate the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act ensued. The Court affirmed the conviction on the theory
that the Communications Act was not violated since there was neither
a "communication" nor "interception" within its terms. Had there
been an actual trespass to defendant's office, the Court stated, the
fourth amendment would have been violated.
The next major case in the wiretap area arose against the back-
ground of national security and involved the problem that lay at the
core of the more recent and celebrated case of Jencks v. United
States 16-to what extent is the government required to divulge in-
formation imperiling national security in order to secure a conviction.
1 Id. at 340.
12303 U.S. 321 (1939).
13 If there is in fact "authorization by the sender," the statute is not violated.
See 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
14 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
25 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
16353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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In United States v. Coplon,17 the defendant was accused and
convicted of an attempt to deliver "defense information" to a Soviet
national as well as conspiracy to defraud the United States. Defen-
dant showed that FBI agents had tapped her telephone conversations
for two months prior to her arrest. The government placed records
of all the tapped conversations before the trial judge who examined
them and permitted defense counsel to examine all but those he
thought injurious to the national security. The trial judge found as
a fact that the wiretaps had not led to any material evidence at the
trial.' 8 The Court of Appeals set aside the conviction and held that
the defendant had a constitutional right to see wiretap records even
though they contained security information. Judge Hand said in part:
• . . the refusal to allow the defence to see them [the wiretap records]
was . . . a denial of their constitutional right, and we can see no significant
distinction between introducing evidence against an accused which he is not
allowed to see, and denying him the right to put in evidence on his own behalf.' 9
Any thought that acquittal would follow merely because wiretap
evidence was involved was dispelled by two cases reaching the
Supreme Court in 1952. In On Lee v. United States' defendant
ran a laundry in Hoboken, N.J. A former acquaintance engaged him
in conversation in his shop, during the course of which defendant
made incriminating remarks relative to the sale of narcotics. Defen-
dant did not know that his friend was in fact an undercover agent for
the Bureau of Narcotics. Nor did he realize that he was carrying a
concealed microphone which was transmitting the conversation outside
the building. The Court sustained defendant's conviction, taking the
position that what had been done did not fall within the prohibition
of the Federal Communications Act. As Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth
Amendment to make them bedfellows with spurious liberties improvised by
farfetched analogies. . . . He [the federal officer] was not sending messages
to anybody or using a system of communication within the Act.21
In Schwartz v. Texas,22 defendant sought to set aside his convic-
tion in a state court as an accomplice to robbery on the ground that
evidence vital to the establishment of his guilt was inadmissible in
evidence by reasqn of the Federal Communications Act. Incriminat-
ing telephone conversations with a betraying former accomplice had
been recorded by means of an induction coil apparatus. A Texas
statute rendered inadmissible evidence obtained in violation of the
constitution or laws of Texas or of the Constitution of the United
17 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
Is United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
19 United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950).20343 U.S. 747 (1952).
21 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952).
22344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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States but not evidence obtained in violation of federal statutes2 3
The Supreme Court held that Congress, in enacting Section 605, had
not evinced an unmistakable intent to make it a rule of evidence ap-
plicable to state court proceedings.
Where a state has carefully legislated so as not to render inadmissible evi-
dence obtained and sought to be divulged in violation of the laws of the
United States, this Court will not extend by implication the statute of the
United States so as to invalidate the specific language of the state statute.2 4
The latest developments in the federal wiretap picture center
around three second circuit cases decided this year. United States v.
Benanti 25 provided at least a tentative answer to the recurring ques-
tion of whether evidence obtained by a state officer in violation of
Section 605 would under any circumstances be admissible in a federal
prosecution. In that case New York City police tapped a telephone
in a bar frequented by defendants. The tapping was done pursuant
to a state court order in the belief that defendants were dealing in
narcotics in violation of state law. Operating on information secured
through the taps and on the supposition that the narcotics law was
being violated, the police stopped the defendants' car. They found
no narcotics but instead discovered cans of alcohol which failed to
bear the required tax stamps. Federal prosecution followed and de-
fendants sought to exclude the wiretap evidence. The court held that
since no collusion with or participation by federal officers was involved
the evidence was admissible.
In United States v. Costello,26 the federal government sought to
cancel the citizenship of the defendant on the ground of illegality and
fraud in its procurement. To support this contention, counsel for
the government submitted an affidavit of good cause particularly de-
tailing the fraudulent statements supplied by defendant in his 1925
petition for naturalization. On the third day of the trial the district
judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the
government evidence was permeated with the fruit of illegal wiretaps.
The wiretaps concededly had been made by federal officers in 1925
and 1926 and by state officers in 1943. The Court of Appeals held
that the government should have been given the opportunity to submit
a new affidavit based on untainted evidence .2 7 It further held as to
the 1925 and 1926 wiretaps that Section 605 was not intended to
operate retroactively and that it was not a crime to republish informa-
tion which was lawfully intercepted and divulged prior to that sec-
tion's passage. As to the 1943 wiretaps the court followed the Benanti
holding that since they were effected by state officers without federal
2 3 TEX. CODE CRim. PRoc. art. 727a (1941).
24 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202 (1952).
25244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957).
28 145 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd, 247 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1957).
27 United States v. Costello, 247 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1957).
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connivance they were admissible in federal court. The case was
remanded for further action.
United States v. Gris251 involved a prosecution for violation of
Section 605. Defendant, a private detective, had been retained to
secure evidence against his client's wife in a divorce action brought
by the client. An elaborate wiretap apparatus was fabricated and
employed. The United States Court of Appeals sustained defendants
conviction despite the fact that New York, the jurisdiction where the
tapping took place and in which the divorce suit was brought, admits
such evidence. It was pointed out that even if the defendant met New
York's statutory requirements for authorized wiretapping, which was
not the case, his conduct would still be violative of the overriding
federal statute.
New York Statutory Law on Wiretapping
No understanding of New York case law relative to wiretapping
is possible without an appreciation of the statutory enactments which
underlie the decisions. It is important to realize that in New York,
unlike the federal jurisdiction, major modifications in the law have
been undertaken by the legislature rather than by the courts.
The earliest statutes on the subject in New York as in most
states were designed primarily to protect property from trespass and
only secondarily to protect the privacy of communications. Thus in
1892 the legislature enacted the provision which is now subdivision 6
of Section 1423 of the Penal Law.29 That section prohibits the break-
ing or cutting of a telephone wire as well as the unauthorized reading
or copying of any message coming over the same. This statute ap-
parently was not intended to have any application to wiretapping by
public officers acting in their official capacity since their activity would
not possess the statutory requisites of unlawfulness and wilfulness.
Another early statute prohibited the unauthorized obtaining of mes-
sages through collusion with a telephone or telegraph employee.30
The only other statute relevant to wiretapping by private persons
prior to the wholesale revision which took place in 1957 was Section
552-a of the Penal Law enacted in 1949.31 This section prohibited
the possession of wiretap instruments under circumstances evincing
an intent to make use of them illegally.
Prior to 1957 the only pieces of legislation designed to regulate
wiretapping by public officers were a constitutional provision enacted
in 1938 and a statute designed to implement its policy.
28 United States v. Gris, 138 N.Y.L.J. 1, col. 1-2 (U.S. Court of Appeals.
2d Cir., Sept. 12, 1957).29 Laws of N.Y. 1892, c. 372.
30 Laws of N.Y. 1895, c. 727.
31 Laws of N.Y. 1949, c. 519.
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Section 12 of Article I of the New York State Constitution was
a compromise arrived at after spirited debate at the constitutional
convention.3 2 It provides that orders authorizing public wiretapping
shall issue only where there are reasonable grounds for believing that
evidence of crime may thereby be obtained. The amendment likewise
requires the setting forth of the name of the person whose wire is to
be tapped, the particular means of communication involved and the
purpose for which the tap is being made.33
Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted by the
legislature in 1942, was designed to implement the constitutional pro-
vision and to spell out the exact requirements that would have to be
met to secure an interception order. By the terms of the statute
anyone above the rank of sergeant in any police force in the state is
permitted to apply for a wiretap order by making application to a
Supreme Court or County Court judge. The order, if granted, is to
be effective for the time specified therein or, in any case, for a period
not longer than six months unless the judge granting the original
order is satisfied that extension or renewal is in the public interest.34
New York Case Law on Wiretapping
As a general proposition, New York law on admissibility of
wiretap evidence has paralleled the New York rule on admissibility
of evidence secured by illegal search and seizure. In the leading case
of People v. Defore,35 defendant was found guilty of carrying a black-
jack after previously having been convicted of the unlawful possession
of a firearm. Defendant had been arrested for stealing an overcoat
but a search of his room revealed the blackjack. The court sustained
his comviction despite the fact that the search and seizure prerequisite
to the same was illegal, holding that, in New *York, evidence however
seized is admissible.
A case specifically dealing with wiretapping had anticipated this
result. In People v. McDonald, 6 defendant's conviction for book-
making was sustained over the contention that some of the evidence
used to convict had been obtained in violation of statute. The court
took the position that wiretapping should not be treated differently
32 See Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 33 CORNzrA. L.Q. 73, 84 (1947).
33 The relevant portion of the provision is as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of
telephone and telegraphic communications shall not be violated, and ex parte
orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reason-
able ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identify-
ing the particular means of communication, and particularly describing the person
or persons whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof."
N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 12.
34 Laws of N.Y. 1942, c. 924.
35 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
a1 177 App. Div. 806, 165 N.Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dep't 1917).
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than any other search and seizure with reference to the admissibility
of evidence obtained thereby.
Some doubt on New York's position was engendered by the de-
cision of the Appellate Division in the case of In re Davis.87 Here
the court admitted wiretap evidence in disbarment proceedings despite
the fact that the tapping involved violation of a New York statute.
The court stressed the point that the tapping had been done by federal
agents with no thought of the instant proceedings and intimated that
a different result would have followed had the tapping been initiated
with respondent in mind. However, subsequent cases ignored the
suggested caveat.
In Martinelli v. Valentine,8 8 New York City police seized six
telephones without court order. Defendant sought an order of man-
damus requiring the Police Commissioner to return the telephones.
The commissioner contended that the telephones were being employed
in illegal gambling transactions and that replevin would afford defen-
dant an adequate remedy. The court held that seizure of the tele-
phones was a violation of the New York State Constitution and felt
that mandamus provides an appropriate remedy for a wrong that
would be continued and condoned if the order were refused8
A case that reached the Court of Appeals involved the applica-
tion of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act to a state
proceeding. 40 There petitioner obtained a license to cash checks. In
a hearing by the Superintendent of Banks to determine whether the
license should be revoked, intercepted telephone communications, ob-
tained pursuant to an ex parte order, were introduced. Petitioner
contended that such introduction violated his constitutional rights as
well as Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. The Court
of Appeals held that petitioner's constitutional rights were not vio-
lated and that Section 605 was not applicable. Employing a rationale
which anticipated a subsequent federal case, the court said:
The State of New York having provided, by Constitution and statute, certain
specific methods by which it may exercise its fundamental power of gathering
evidence of criminality and of prosecuting crime, it surely is not to be assumed
that Congress intended to circumscribe that power unless it unequivocally indi-
cated such an intent. A Federal statute, it is recognized, must be presumed to
be limited in effect to the Federal jurisdiction and not to supersede a State's
exercise of its police power unless there be a clear manifestation to the
contrary.41
In People v. Appelbaum, 42 the Appellate Division held that a telephone
37252 App. Div. 591, 299 N.Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1937).
38 179 Misc. 486, 39 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
39 The difficulty with the remedy of replevin was the time element.
40 Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E2d 854 (1946)
(per curiam).
41 Id. at 17, 68 N.E.2d at 855.
42 277 App. Div. 43, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807 (2d Dep't), aff'd iner., 301 N.Y. 738,
95 N.E.2d 410 (1950).
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subscriber may determine if his line is being used to his detriment
by those whom he permits to use it, and that he may have his line
tapped or checked so that his business may not be damaged, his house-
hold relations impaired or his marital status disrupted.
A novel attack on public wiretapping was attempted in Black v.
Impelliteri.43  In that case petitioner, relying on Section 51 of the
General Municipal Law, 44 sued as a taxpayer to enjoin an alleged
waste of funds by officers of New York City. He contended that
maintenance of equipment for wiretapping was a violation of the
federal wiretap statute which superseded any New York policy to the
contrary. The court, relying on Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v.
Bell,45 held that the federal statute does not extend to contravene state
policy to the contrary and, further, that since wiretapping, even if
illegal, results in the apprehension of criminals it cannot be regarded
as a waste of funds.
The 1957 New York Wiretap Statutes
In 1955 the New York Legislature decided that the time had
come for a detailed and dispassionate analysis of the situation as it
then existed so that appropriate remedial legislation might be formu-
lated. To accomplish this end the legislature created the Joint Legis-
lative Committee to Study Illegal Interception of Communications.4"
The Committee interviewed people ranging from professional wire-
tappers to the Police Commissioner of New York City. At length.
it submitted a report calling for sweeping changes in the then existing
law. Five basic proposals were made: ¥T
(1) An amendment of the Penal Law making eavesdropping
by instrument illegal as to all private persons including a
subscriber seeking to tap his own telephone.
(2) Amendment of the Civil Rights Law to make the disclosure
of information or evidence secured through eavesdropping
by instrument a misdemeanor and provide both injunctive
4 201 Misc. 371, 111 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. C), cff'd, 281 App. Div. 671,
117 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1st Dep't 1952), appeal dismissed, 305 N.Y. 724, 112 N.E.2d
845 (1953).
44 The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows: "All officers, agents,
commissioners and other persons acting, or who have acted, for and on behalf
of any county, town, village or municipal corporation in this state, and each and
every one of them, may be prosecuted, and an action may be maintained against
them to prevent any illegal official act on the part of any such officers, agents.
commissioners or other persons, or to prevent waste or injury to, or to restore
and make good, any property, funds or estate of such county, town, village or
municipal corporation.... ." N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw § 51.
45 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E2d 854 (1946) (per curiam).
46 See McKINNE's SEsslox LAws oF NEW Yo=x 1519, 1522 (1955).
47 See REPORT ON ILLEGAL INTEcmON OF COMIMUNICATIONS, McKIINNEY's
SESSION LAws OF NEW YoRK 1348, 1374, 1375 (1956).
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relief and an action for money damages for those whose
privacy is invaded.
(3) An amendment to the Civil Practice Act prohibiting the use
of evidence obtained by eavesdropping with instrument in
any trial or proceedings, civil or criminal, unless a court
order had first been obtained.
(4) An amendment requiring the telephone company to provide
direct connection between any line authorized by court order
to be tapped and law enforcement headquarters.
(5) An amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure reauir-
ing a court order for eavesdropping with an instrument of
any kind.
The 1957 New York Statutes as Adopted
The statutory overhauling undertaken by the legislature this year
fell somewhat short of carrying out the Committee's sweeping recom-
mendations but nevertheless constitutes a significant change in the law.
Section 813-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes wire-
tapping by a law enforcement officer without a court order a felony.
punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than two years.48
An amendment to the Civil Practice Act prohibits the admis-
sibility in civil actions of evidence obtained by illegal wiretapping or
eavesdropping as redefined in Article 73 of the Penal Law, whether
done by private persons or public officers. 49  An exception is made
to permit the admissibility of such evidence in a disciplinary hearing
or administrative proceeding by or on behalf of any governmental
agency. It is to be noted that evidence obtained in violation of the
new statutes remains admissible in criminal actions.
48 "Unlawful wire tapping by law enforcement officers. Any law enforce-
ment officer, not being a sender or receiver of a telephonic communication, who
wilfully and by means of instrument intercepts, overhears or records a telephonic
communication, or who aids, authorizes, employs, procures or permits another
to so do, without the consent of either a sender or receiver thereof, and without
an order as provided for under section eight hundred thirteen-a of this code,
shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two
years." N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-b.49N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 345-a. The provision reads as follows: "Eaves-
dropping evidence inadmissible. Evidence obtained by any act of eavesdropping,
as defined in section seven hundred thirty-eight of the penal law, or by any act
in violation of Section Eight Hundred Thirteen-b of the code of criminal pro-
cedure, and evidence obtained throtigh or resulting from information obtained by
any such act, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any civil action, proceeding
or hearing; provided, however, that any such evidence shall be admissible in any
disciplinary trial or hearing or in any administrative action, proceeding or hear-




The most important addition to the law involves the enactment
of a new Article 73 of the Penal Law entitled "Eavesdropping." 5 0
The key section of the article proscribes three courses of conduct,
all involving eavesdropping by instrument. One clause forbids the
overhearing or recording of a telephone or telegraph communication
without the consent of the sender or receiver thereof. The second
clause prohibits the overhearing or recording of a conversation with-
out the consent of a party thereto by one not present during the
conversation. The final clause safeguards the deliberations of a jury
from being overheard or recorded. 51 In a separate proviso, one who
taps his own phone and who otherwise falls within the terms of the
statute is declared to be an eavesdropper. 52
Under another section of Article 73 possession of instruments
commonly employed for eavesdropping, under circumstances evincing
an intent to use them illegally, is a misdemeanor. One found in such
possession who has previously been convicted of any crime is guilty
of a felony. 3
Another section in the article deals with divulging telephone and
telegraph company information and impersonating employees. 54 By
its terms the following conduct is subjected to punishment as a
felony:
(1) Obtaining knowledge of a telephone or telegraph communi-
cation by connivance with telephone or telegraph employees.
(2) Divulgence by a telephone or telegraph employee to anyone
but the intended recipient of the contents of a message which
he has been entrusted to deliver or of which he is otherwise
possessed.
(3) Neglect on the part of a telephone or telegraph employee
to transmit or deliver messages received, save where they
are being used for criminal purposes.
(4) Failure on part of an officer or employee of a telephone or
telegraph company to furnish information in his possession
relating to unlawful enterprise being carried on through
telephone or telegraph employees, to the appropriate law
enforcement agency.
The same statute makes it a misdemeanor for one. who through
trick, false representation or impersonation, obtains information about
50 Laws of N.Y. 1957, c. 881.
51N.Y. PEIN. LAW § 738.
52 This is so by reason of the definition of the word "person" provided in
Penal Law § 741.
53 N.Y. PrEN. LAW § 742.
54 Id. § 743.
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apparatus used in furnishing service or access to telephone or tele-
graph company premises or installations. 5
Furthermore, if one makes a disclosure to an unauthorized per-
son of information concerning the granting or denial of an order for
wiretapping as provided for in Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. 56 The legislature also re-
pealed various statutes, including one that had outlawed eavesdropping
in the classic sense. 57
Conclusion
The only ultimate solution to the wiretap problem would be its
complete prohibition to public authority and private persons alike.
It is always difficult to enforce a law which the Sovereign finds neces-
sary to break.
New York has this year made a significant attempt to eliminate
or at least assuage the evils of wiretapping and eavesdropping by
instrument. It is felt that two additional, unenacted recommenda-
tions of the Joint Legislative Commission should be adopted. One
would make injunctive relief and an action for money damages avail-
able to anyone whose right of privacy is invaded by the disclosure
of information acquired through eavesdropping with instrument.
Another would limit law enforcement officers authorized to wiretap
to connections effected for them by the telephone company. Such a
limitation would make easier the enforcement of prohibitions against
wiretapping. With the adoption of these recommendations New
York law would become a model for the regulation of tapping in
other parts of the country.
It is felt that a re-evaluation of the federal wiretap picture is in
order. The controlling statute there is now twenty-three years old
and was enacted in an offhanded manner and without any thorough
analysis of the problem.
Legislative action should include at least the following:
(1) Prohibition of unauthorized interception of communications
by wiretapping or eavesdropping instruments regardless of
whether there is a subsequent divulgence.
(2) Authorization of wiretapping by federal agents if a court
order is secured.
55Id. § 743(2), (3).
56 Id. § 745.
ST Thus the legislature repealed §§ 552, 552-a and 721 of the Penal Law.
Sections 552 and 552-a were substantially re-enacted by §§ 743 and 742 re-
spectively. Section 721, now discarded, had provided: "A person, who
secretly loiters about a building, with intent to overhear discourse therein, and




(3) Protection of the sanctity of the jury room by a provision
prohibiting the disclosure of communications emanating
therefrom whether overheard or recorded.
x
THE SUPREME COURT, THE SmITH ACT, AND THE "CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER" TEST
Introduction
Recent developments in the law have emphasized a need for
reconciling the freedoms of the individual citizen with the recognized
right of a lawfully-constituted sovereign to protect itself from violent
overthrow. Among these freedoms, none deserves greater attention
at the present time than the freedom of speech protected by the first
amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Like all rights, freedom of speech ". . . is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances." 1 But to admit that this freedom
is not absolute is not severely to limit it. Rather, it is to recognize
that there will be times when . . . restriction ... is required in order
to protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political,
economic or moral." 2
Occasions for limitation arose early in our history. Soon after
our nation had freed itself from England, threats to its life appeared.3
To meet them Congress passed the much-criticized Alien and Sedition
Acts.4 It was not until 1917 that the next major federal curtailment
of speech occurred. This time it was an act which sought to curb
interference with the war effort.5 Forty years later, in 1957, contro-
I Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). For decisions
where abridgements of this freedom have been upheld, see, e.g., Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, supra (statute prohibited addressing others in offensive, de-
risive or annoying language in public places); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927) (statute prohibited organization of groups to advocate and teach
criminal syndicalism); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (statute
prohibited advocacy of criminal anarchy).2 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion).
3 One author has estimated that in 1798, when war with France appeared
inevitable, there were some 30,000 unfriendly Frenchmen organized into groups
within our borders. 1 HRPEr's ECYCLOPAEDiA or UNITED STATES HISTORY
101 (1905). For background material on our relations with France during
that period, see BAssEr, THE FEDmALST SYS=EM 218-29 (Hart ed. 1906);
Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist Period; The
Sedition Act, 18 MicH. L. Rav. 615 (1920).
4 Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 STAT. 577; act of July 14, 1798, c. 74,
I STAT. 596.
5 Espionage Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 217, repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948).
